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"Seven red-team laps."
The loop ledger records one completed lap. Six of the seven pass directories were human-driven work outside the driver, which redteam/loop/state/lap-accounting.jsonl sets out. Say "adversarial passes with closures locked as regression tests".
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Any regulatory or standards date
No EU AI Act article, no prEN 18229-1, no ISO/IEC 24970, no compliance deadline, in the README, on any page, or in any release note. The build guide's own instruction is to re-verify all three before they appear anywhere, and they have not been re-verified.
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"Fully secure", or any unbounded security claim
The honest naming is known-pattern scrubbing, not secret removal, and there is a four-character floor under it. Zero crashes at a given fuzz budget is evidence, not proof.
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That a decomposition is checked for whether it satisfies the goal
It is not. The harness checks that a graph is well formed and that its declared nodes ran and landed. The --goal run in docs/evidence/2026-08-24/swarm.md passed every structural check on a decomposition that could not work. Say "declared before it runs and checked for structure".
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That redundancy picks the best solution
The comparator picks the most disciplined green attempt. No number it reads tells doing the whole task from doing the minimum that passes its own tests, and a number that could would be a judge, which section 2 refuses.
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That the oracle-reach check proves an oracle judged the change
It proves the oracle *executed* the lines, which is a necessary condition and not a sufficient one, and for every runner but node's own it reads a coverage report the workspace's own processes wrote. Nothing detects a forged one. That is safe only because the check can do nothing but refuse: a forged report buys reached, which is what an unmeasured oracle already gets. Say "refuses to certify on an oracle shown to have skipped part of the change".
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That the oracle bond proves the oracle judged the task
It asks whether the oracle asserted anything about the lines the patch *added*, and it cannot ask what the patch left out. Measured rather than reasoned about: shown the oracle it would be judged by, a model writes a patch whose added lines that oracle tests, so the oracle refuses every mutant of them and the bond reads held on a patch a held-back oracle rejects. Say "asks whether running the oracle established anything about the change it did make".
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That a `vacuous` verdict means the mutant changed behaviour, or that an `unshown` one means it did not
Two detectors are asked, the oracle's own coverage and the repository's own suite, and what each cannot see is written down: coverage misses a value changed on a path that runs either way, and a suite written before the patch existed misses anything the patch is adding. A mutant both miss is recorded as unwitnessed, which is an absence of evidence and not evidence of absence.
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Any number the tool did not measure locally
No benchmark, no comparison against another agent, no throughput figure carried over from a model card. The shortlist's size and memory figures are curated estimates and the select report says so itself.
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Any suggestion the four judge-shaped residuals are closed
They are open, they ship as documented limitations, and each is a permanent case in the adversarial suite asserting the gap as it stands.
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That the campaign ranks the models, or measures the tool as it ships
Its outcome is a judge over the tree, not a measure of a change's quality; the two arms ran under different backends with different failure shapes; and the corpus measures the CLI packed on 2026-09-02, before two defects it exposed were fixed. The non-node numbers are a floor for the fixed tool, not a measure of it, and the frontier arm has no measurement at all.